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REFLECTIONS ON A TURBULENT
DECADE*
By WILLIAM D. MOULL**
Some years ago, the Osgoode Hall Law Journal published an
article of mine called "Natural Resources: The Other Crisis in
Canadian Federalism."1  As its title suggests, that article was an
attempt to depict the crisis for Canadian federalism that I saw in the
The apparent recent harmony between federal and provincial governments on natural
environment issues may only represent a temporary hiatus in persistent conflicts. Despite
regional agreements and constitutional reform, areas of potential conflict remain. The "resource
amendment" in s. 92A of the 1982 Constitution strengthens provincial legislative authority over
indirect taxation on resources and resource production and marketing. The provinces can also
continue to rely on the Crown proprietary rights of the provincial governments under s.109.
Federal authority in the natural resource area continues to be found under the general aspect
of the "trade and commerce" power in s.91(2)A although the scope of that power is not fully
defined. This paper discusses some areas of likely conflict in the future and the scope of the
authorities which may be relied upon by the federal or provincial governments as well as the
implications of cooperative federalism and judicial review in the natural resources area. The
author concludes that while conflict is probable, it also provides an opportunity for Canada to
strengthen methods of intergovernmental dispute resolution.
Copyright, William D. Moull, 1987.
Associate Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, Toronto. The thoughts
expressed in this paper grew out of my reflections on a seminar called "The Constitution and
Natural Resources" that I taught at the Law School in the Winter Term 1986. I am grateful
to Mark Gillen, of the Law School's 1985 graduating class, whose research assistance during the
summer of 1985 proved invaluable in planning and preparing for the seminar, and to the
students in the seminar whose questions and comments provoked much re-thinking of old ideas.
Many others also deserve to be acknowledged here for their help and support in my past
attempts to write about the issues dealt with in this paper, but unfortunately they are too
numerous to mention individually. In any event, they already know who they are, and hopefully
they will realize the extent of my appreciation for their contributions.
1(1980) 18 Osgoode Hall L J. 1.
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persistent intergovernmental resource disputes of the 1970s. It dealt
at some length with the decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada
in CIGOL2 and Central Canada Potash,3 which seemed to have
struck twin body blows to provincial legislative powers to raise
revenues from resources and to regulate resource development,
production and marketing. Its conclusions offered some suggestions
for change in a federal system that seemed to have become
unbalanced as a result of those decisions, as well as some comments
on the broader implications of the resource disputes for the process
of resolving intergovernmental conflict in a federal state.
Much has happened since then, of course. For one thing,
the resource disputes continued unabated into the 1980s. Not long
after my article appeared, the federal government launched a frontal
assault on provincial powers in relation to resources under its
National Energy Program of October 1980. The NEP sparked a
predictably hostile response from the Western producing provinces,
especially Alberta, and led to a year's worth of open
federal-provincial warfare including provincial cutbacks in oil
production and a Supreme Court challenge to some of the taxation
proposals of the NEP.4 Shortly thereafter, the primary focus of
dispute shifted to the East as Newfoundland's long-simmering
disagreements with the federal government over offshore resources
and with Quebec over Churchill Falls hydro both broke wide open.
The Supreme Court was once again called upon to adjudicate these
2 Canadian Industrial Gas & Oil Ltd v. Saskatchewan (1977), [1978] 2 S.C.R1 545, 80 D.L.R.
(3d) 449.
3 Central Canada Potash Co. Ltdv. Saskatchewan (1978), [1979] 1 S.C.R 42,88 D.L.R. (3d)
609.
4 Reference Re Proposed Federal Tax on Exported Natural Gas (1982), [1982] 1 S.C.IL 1004,
136 D.L.R1 (3d) 385. For discussion of this decision and its implications, see V. D. Moull,
"Alberta Natural Gas Tax Reference: Effect on Public Enterprise in Canada" (1983) 7 Can. Bus.
L. J. 485, and W. D. Moull, "Intergovernmental Immunity from Taxation: The Unresolved
Issues" (1984) 32 Can. Tax J. 54.
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battles, ultimately holding against Newfoundland's view of its own
powers in both cases.5
Not all was contention, however. In the fall of 1981, a series
of agreements between the federal government and the Western
provinces called a truce in the post-NEP warfare. Further
agreements since then, culminating in the "Western Accord" of early
1985, have managed to keep the lid on most potential sources of
conflict between Ottawa and the West. In the East, Nova Scotia
was able to negotiate an arrangement with the federal government
on offshore resource development without resorting to the courts for
determination of ownership and jurisdictional issues. The dispute
over the Newfoundland offshore was eventually settled, at least in
principle, in early 1985 under the "Atlantic Accord" that
Newfoundland was offered by a new and much more compliant
federal government. (So far, however, it seems that Quebec is not
nearly as willing to relinquish its Churchill Falls victory through
further negotiated concessions to Newfoundland.)
In 1982, the Constitution was amended to incorporate the
"resource amendment" in section 92A. Almost unnoticed in the
fanfare over the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, section
92A tried to address some of the contentious federal-provincial
resource issues that had kindled the 1970's crisis in the first place.
It was the only component of the 1982 constitutional patriation
package that purported to alter the division of federal-provincial
legislative powers, and it represents the first amendment to the
Constitution since Confederation that has had the effect of
enhancing the legislative authority of the provinces.7
5Reference Re The Seabed and Subsoil of the Continental Shelf Offshore Newfoundland (1984),
[1984] 1 S.C.R1 86, 5 D.LLR (4th) 385; Re Upper Churchill Water Rights Reversion Act (1984),
[1984] 1 S.C.R. 297, (sub nom. Churchill Falls (Labrador) Corp. Ltd v.A. G. Newfoundland) 8
D.LR (4th) 1. For discussion of these decisions, see W. D. Moull, "Newfoundland Resources:
The Supreme Court Strikes Again" (1985) 7 Supreme Court L. Rev. 419.
6 Constitution Act 1982, Part VI, sections 50 and 51; being Schedule B of the Canada Act
1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11.
7J. P. Meekison & R J. Romanow, "Western Advocacy and Section 92A of the
Constitution," in J. P. Meekison, R J. Romanow & W. D. Moull, Origins andMeaning of Section
924: The 1982 Constitutional Amendment on Resources (Montreal: The Institute for Research
on Public Policy, 1985) 3 at 3.
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So now, after more than a decade of turbulence, we seem to
have reached a period of relative intergovernmental tranquility in
relation to natural resources. In fact, some seem tempted to believe
that the disputes of the recent past are but a messy bit of ancient
history, forever banished in a new state of federal-provincial
harmony. For instance, in mid-1986 the then newly-appointed
federal Minister of Energy, Marcel Masse, was asked to comment on
reports that Alberta Premier Don Getty had threatened to reduce
the flow of Alberta natural gas to Eastern Canada unless the federal
government did something more to support the ailing petroleum
industry in the province. Mr. Masse is reported to have said: "This
is not a re-run of history. This is a new script where governments
should not fight."8
Perhaps. But sometimes memory is short. The disputes of
the 1970s and early 1980s were preceded by several decades of
generally harmonious relations both between the federal and
provincial governments and between governments and the resource
industries, engendered largely by substantial identities of interest
among all concerned. 9 Indeed, in the Introduction to his 1969 book
on the subject, Professor Gerard V. LaForest (now LaForest, J. of
the Supreme Court of Canada) could suggest with justifiable
confidence that "...today all major problems of ownership of the
public domain have been settled...."10 Little could he have known
that the settled state of placid equilibrium that he then perceived
would be dramatically upset, barely four years later, in the wake of
the 1973 Arab oil embargo. Nor could anyone have then anticipated
the ensuing decade of often-bitter intergovernmental resource
disputes, both legal and extra-legal, stretching to and beyond the
introduction of the resource amendment in 1982.
So there is no real historical reason to assume that our
present state of relative intergovernmental harmony will be any more
8 D. Francis, "No gas moves east at 'fire sale' price, Getty vows," The Toronto Star (10 July
1986) E-1.
9R. D. Cairns, M. A. Chandler & W. D. Moull, "The Resource Amendment (Section 92A)
and the Political Economy of Canadian Federalism" (1985) 23 Osgoode Hall L. J. 253 at 254-56.
1 0 G. V. LaForest, Natural Resources and Public Property under the Canadian Constitution
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1969) at xi.
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permanent than that which subsisted before late 1973. And there
are some very good reasons to believe that further clashes may erupt
at any time. Professor John Whyte, for one, has identified several
factors which he believes may lead to renewed federal ambitions with
respect to provincial resources. 1 These include: increased domestic
expectations for an enhanced role for the federal government in
economic regulation matters generally (for instance, as a result of
proddings from the Macdonald Commission); the potential for a
revived "general" trade and commerce power flowing from the
decision of the Supreme Court in the C. N. Transportation case;
12
and the ever-present risk of further sudden and substantial
dislocations in the international economic order.
This last factor may be the most significant of all. Even a
federal government that typically tends to relative quiescence in
matters of general economic regulation will be forced to respond to
the domestic impact of dramatic changes in international resource
markets. After all, it was the first OPEC oil price "shock" in late
1973, following the Yom Kippur War, that touched off our decade
of disputes, and it was the second OPEC oil price "shock" in 1979,
following the Iranian Revolution, that fuelled the disputes and led
directly to the National Energy Program and its aftermath., It would
seem foolhardy to pretend that similar external events cannot or will
not again upset our domestic arrangements. The fact that the
dramatic fall in world oil prices in the first half of 1986 has not yet
generated the same degree of intergovernmental conflict may attest
only to the current willingness of the governments concerned to
cooperate in the search for some acceptable policy solution. It does
not, in and of itself, indicate that the current cooperative spirit will
be permanent or that a different type of external stimulus (such as
a sudden re-emergence of OPEC as an effective cartel) will not
cause a renewal of domestic friction.
But even in the absence of external "shocks" to our domestic
arrangements, or even assuming speedy and non-contentious
"IJ. D. Whyte, "Issues in Canadian Federal-Provincial Cooperation" in J. 0. Saunders, ed.,
Managing Natural Resources in a Federal State (Toronto: Carswell, 1986) 322 at 330-31.
1 2A. G. Canada v. Canadian National Transportation Ltd (1983), [1983] 2 S.C.IR 206, 3
D.LR. (4th) 16.
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federal-provincial accommodation to all future external events, the
pursuit of certain domestic policies by the federal government may
well lead to renewed intergovernmental conflict over natural
resources. Notable here is the current "free trade" initiative of the
federal government, backed by the urgings of the Macdonald
Commission for a "leap of faith" in the direction of the United
States. It is impossible to say where the free trade negotiations
with the United States may take us, if indeed they go anywhere at
all. But given the degree to which the Canadian economy remains
heavily resource-reliant, and given past American interest in cheap
and easy access to Canadian resources (though only when desirable
from their point of view, of course), it seems hard to imagine that
Canadian resources will disappear from the free trade bargaining
table. Any move towards free trade will thus have significant
potential to affect not only our domestically-formulated resource
development policies, but also the relationships between the two
orders of government constitutionally charged with formulating those
policies.
It is also important to remember that the resource disputes
of the last decade were as much inter-regional conflicts as they were
federal-provincial battles. Spiralling world energy prices in the
1970s caused a significant divergence of interests between the
predominant energy-producing region in the West and the
predominant energy-consuming regions of the East. The resulting
inter-regional conflict quickly became superimposed upon the sources
of dispute already apparent as between the producing provinces and
the federal government in pursuit of its own policy objectives, as
Ottawa attempted to resolve both the inter-regional cleavages and
its own quarrels with the West in what it saw as the best interests
of the country as a whole.13 Similarly, and no matter whether the
initial impetus was external or domestic, it would be very difficult for
the federal government to ignore any future inter-regional conflict
over resource development policies even in the unlikely event that
Ottawa believed it had no particular policy position of its own to
advance in the circumstances.
13 Cairns, Chandler & Moull, supra, note 9 at 256-60.
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So the seeds of future federal-provincial conflict over
resources remain in the 1980s despite the present appearance of
tranquility. And whenever they sprout, and for whatever reason, the
division of constitutional powers with respect to resources is likely
once again to become a principal battlefield. As John Whyte has
put it:
In short, the recent withdrawal from Canadianization, nationalization and
redistributive policies with respect to oil and gas does not represent a long-term
vacuum of federal policy in the energy sector. The ownership interests of provinces,
as well as their jurisdiction over exploration, development, conservation and
management of non-renewable resources [under section 92A], are increasingly likely
to come in conflict with federal economic regulatory objectives. The demand for a
creative reconciliation of thee competing interests is going to be as acute in the
future as it was in the 1970s. 4
But if it is a relatively safe bet to predict that there is every
prospect of renewed intergovernmental conflict over natural
resources, it is much harder to say with assurance just where that
conflict might erupt within the heads of federal and provincial
legislative power available under the Constitution. Since late 1973,
the constitutional position in relation to natural resources has rather
resembled a prolonged chess game in which not only the strategies
of the players but also the rules of play - and even some of the
pieces on the board - have changed with the passage of time.
Forecasting the future progress of such a game, let alone its
eventual outcome, is a difficult proposition at best.
On the provincial side of the board, of course, the major new
piece is section 92A. While the section was designed specifically to
respond to certain of the concerns of the Western resource-
producing provinces following the CIGOL and Central Canada
Potash decisions in the late 1970s, it seems destined to play an
important role in any future dispute over the scope of provincial
legislative powers in relation to natural resources.15
1 4 Whyte, supra, note 11 at 332.
1 5 For more extensive discussion of the intricacies of section 92A than is provided in the
following paragraphs, see W. D. Moull, "Section 92A of the Constitution Act, 1867" (1983) 61
Can. Bar Rev. 715; W. D. Moull, "Mineral Taxation in Saskatchewan under the New
Constitution" in R. H. Bartlett, ed., Mining Law in Canada (Saskatoon: Law Society of
Saskatchewan, 1984) 221; and W. D. Moull, "The Legal Effect of the Resource Amendment -
What's New in Section 92A?" in J. P. Meekison, R. J. Romanow & W. D. Moull, supra, note
7 at 33.
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For instance, subsection 92A(4) now enshrines provincial
powers to levy indirect taxation on resources and resource
production. So long as a provincial legislative measure can be truly
characterized as "taxation" in the sense that it is primarily revenue-
raising and not regulatory in nature, and so long as that measure
does not purport to tax differentially in respect of resource
production that is exported from the province for consumption
elsewhere in Canada, subsection 92A(4) now provides a safe haven
for provincial resource taxation regimes that could have been called
into question under the much more restrictive "direct" taxation power
in section 92(2). In any future fight over the scope of its powers to
raise revenues from resources, and whether its actual antagonist is
the federal government or a member of the private sector,16 a
provincial government acting within the ambit of subsection 92A(4)
will find itself in a far stronger position than did Saskatchewan in
the wake of its CIGOL defeat.
Similarly, subsections 92A(1) and (2) now furnish the
producing provinces with additional legislative authority in relation
to the regulation of resource development, production, and
marketing. Under subsection 92A(1), it is now reasonably clear that
a producing province is to have exclusive legislative jurisdiction in
relation to all phases of the resource development process within the
province, at least up to and including any legislated determination of
the rate at which a particular resource is to be produced within the
province. Under subsection 92A(2), a producing province may also
regulate the marketing of its resource production beyond its own
boundaries, so long as its legislation is confined to resource exports
to other parts of Canada and does not purport to discriminate in
prices or in supplies exported to other parts of Canada. While
subsection 92A(3) expressly preserves federal concurrency and
paramountcy in respect of any provincial export marketing legislation
enacted under subsection 92A(2), when taken in combination
subsections 92A(1) and (2) represent a stronger legislative base for
a producing province in the implementation of its chosen resource-
regulation policies than would the pre-existing (and continuing)
powers available under section 92 (such as those under section
161LD. Cairns, M.A. Chandler & W.D. Moull, "Constitutional Change and the Private
Sector. The Case of the Resource Amendment" (1986) 24 Osgoode Hall L. J. 299 at 312-14.
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92(10) in relation to "local works and undertakings," under section
92(13) in relation to "property and civil rights in the province," and
under section 92(16) in relation to "generally all matters of a merely
local or private nature in the province").
But section 92A is not the only string in the provincial bow.
Depending upon the pattern of ownership rights in a given resource-
producing province, the Crown proprietary rights of the provincial
government under section 109 of the Constitution, coupled with the
power to exercise those rights by legislation under section 92(5), may
carry equal or even greater weight in any future confrontation with
Ottawa. In Alberta, for example, the proportion of Crown-owned
oil and gas producing lands is so high (something in excess of 80 per
cent) that there may be little need for the provincial government to
resort to its new legislative powers under section 92A if it can
continue to rely on the tremendous scope that the courts
traditionally have given to section 109 for both revenue-raising and
regulatory purposes.1 7 In the past, for instance, Alberta has relied
upon its position as Crown proprietor in varying oil and gas royalty
rates virtually at will and, in its heated response to the National
Energy Program, in imposing progressive cutbacks in production
from Crown-owned oil pools. It is noteworthy that, at least partially
in recognition of the potency ascribed to provincial Crown
proprietary rights, subsection 92A(6) expressly preserves not only all
pre-existing provincial legislative powers but also all pre-existing
provincial government "rights" as well. It is also of some significance
that any claim that Newfoundland may have had to legislative
authority in the offshore area vanished as soon as the Supreme
Court found that the provincial government had no proprietary rights
in the offshore akin to those held by the provinces in their onshore
resources under section 109.
In contrast to the provincial side of things, what with the
addition of section 92A to the provincial arsenal, there has been no
corresponding formal change in the heads of federal legislative
power that might be brought to bear upon any future resource-
1 7 For further discussion of the nature and scope of provincial Crown proprietary rights and
their relationship to section 92A, see W.D. Moull, "Natural Resources: Provincial Proprietary
Rights, the Supreme Court of Canada, and the Resource Amendment to the Constitution"
(1983) 21 Alberta L Rev. 472.
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related dispute. The principal basis for the exercise of federal
legislative authority in respect of provincially-produced resources
continues to be the "trade and commerce" power under section
91(2), especially in its application to interprovincial and international
trade in resource production. While the producing provinces now
have some legislative entree into the regulation of interprovincial
resource marketing by virtue of subsection 92A(2), as was noted
above subsection 92A(3) provides expressly for the preservation of
federal jurisdiction and legislative paramountcy in relation to the
same subject matter. And, unlike earlier proposals, section 92A does
nothing to enhance provincial legislative authority in relation to
international trade.18 As a matter of legislative jurisdiction, the
regulation of extra-provincial trade in resource production remains
primarily a federal affair.
The major potential development in the heads of federal
legislative authority in relation to natural resources pertains as well
to section 91(2), but in respect of what is commonly called its
"general" aspect. As was noted above,19 John Whyte has suggested
that the prospect of a revived "general" trade and commerce power
as a result of the Supreme Court's decision in the C. N.
Transportation case may act as one of the significant spurs to
renewed federal ambitions towards provincial resources, on the basis
that the possession of such a power tempts its use. But whatever
the impetus for its use may be, a further revivified "general" trade
and commerce power would almost certainly give the federal
government a new lever in any future dispute with the producing
provinces on jurisdictional grounds. The ability to treat the resource
industries, and particularly the energy sector, as an aspect of
"general" trade throughout the country, affecting the nation as a
whole, might well give the federal government previously
uncontemplated authority to regulate provincial resources and
resource production under section 91(2) well before any provincial
boundaries are crossed. However, just what scope the "general"
18For further discussion of the interplay of federal and provincial heads of power in
relation to the interprovincial and international marketing of provincial resource production,
see W.D. Moull, "Pricing Alberta's Gas - Cooperative Federalism and the Resource
Amendment" (1984) 22 Alberta L Rev. 348.
19 See supra, note 11.
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trade and commerce power will have in the future - if, indeed, its
revival continues at all - must remain to be seen.
Aside from the trade and commerce power, the federal
government may still have resort to other heads of power under
section 91 as sources of legislative jurisdiction over provincial
resources. There remains, for example, the seldom-used but still-
potent authority of Parliament under section 92(10)(c) to declare a
"work" situate within a province (a mine, well or refinery, for
instance) to be "for the general advantage of Canada" and thus,
under section 91(29), unilaterally to oust provincial jurisdiction and
bring the work with its attendant undertaking under exclusive federal
legislative authority. Resort might be had to the "emergency" aspect
of the "peace, order and good government" power to deal with
temporary emergency situations, such as a sudden and severe energy
shortage, or to the "residual" aspect of "POGG" in circumstances
(such as those of the Newfoundland offshore) in which neither order
of government could point squarely to any other recognized head of
jurisdiction. Section 91(24) gives Parliament legislative authority
over natural resources found on or under any "lands reserved for the
Indians," even when those lands are situate within the boundaries
of a province and even though they may otherwise be provincial
Crown lands under section 109. And, for general revenue-raising
purposes, section 91(3) continues to give the federal government
ample authority to impose "any mode or system of taxation" it may
choose upon resources, upon resource production, and upon the
persons engaged in resource production, processing, and marketing.
As I suggested above, it is not an easy task to predict with
precision just where any future federal-provincial dispute over
resources might break out within the heads of power available to
both sides. However, the most likely flashpoint of conflict over
resource regulation policies would seem to lie in the divided
authority to regulate the domestic marketing of provincial resource
production. In the initial stages of the resource development
process, from the exploration phase through the placement of
extraction facilities to the commencement of production, the primacy
of provincial jurisdiction seems assured by the grant of exclusive
legislative authority under subsection 92A(1) and the continuance of
the rights conferred on the provincial Crown proprietor under
section 109. It would likely require some extraordinary circumstance,
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and an extraordinary exercise of political will, for the federal
government to attempt to invade the provincial sphere at such an
early stage in the process. At the other extreme, in the context of
the international marketing of provincial resource production, the
exclusive position of the federal government remains unassailable
(subject only to any arguments that a provincial government may
wish to press as to the extended scope of its powers under section
109). It is in the middle ground, as provincial resources are
produced and marketed in other parts of the Canadian economic
unit, that the greatest potential for future conflict lies. It is here
that the producing provinces have gained some measure of authority
under subsections 92A(1) and (2), to supplement their powers
flowing from section 109. But it is also here, by virtue of subsection
92A(3), that the federal government has retained all of its authority
in relation to extra-provincial trade under section 91(2). And it is
here that, in the past decade, the federal government has shown
itself the most willing to exercise its powers in an effort to balance
both its own interests and those of the consuming regions of the
country against the asserted interests of the producing provinces.
In relation to revenue-raising matters, however, the battlefield
seems to have shifted away from the limitations on the scope of
provincial authority because subsection 92A(4) has expanded
provincial taxation powers to the point where they are now virtually
indistinguishable from provincial powers to exact royalties under
section 109. Instead, future contention will more likely revolve
around the appropriate sharing of the revenue-raising jurisdiction
that is now concurrent to the two orders of government, since
neither can expect to fully exert its jurisdiction without impinging
unduly upon the revenue base of the other. The proper scope to
be accorded to the guarantee of intergovernmental immunity from
taxation under section 125 of the Constitution may also prove to be
a continuing source of conflict, particularly in a political climate in
which the drive to privatize Crown resource corporations, both
federal and provincial, seems more rhetorical than real. And our
system of intergovernmental equalization payments, now enshrined
in principle in subsection 36(2) of the Constitution Act, 1982, may
again suffer the kinds of strains placed upon it by the distortions in
provincial revenue-raising capacities that were evident throughout
our turbulent decade.
[VOL 25 NO. 2
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And it may even be that the kinds of resources that will be
the subject of any future federal-provincial dispute will not be those
that occupied centre stage in the past decade. Despite the current
state of oversupply in world markets, it seems hard to imagine that
oil and natural gas will not again play an important role in
federal-provincial relations if and when we face another situation of
shortage, whether real or artificial. But resources like fresh water
may instead become the focal point if, for example, our own supplies
continue to diminish in both quantity and quality and we are
subjected to ongoing pressures to share what we have with an even
more-parched United States. In such a scenario, it is easy to see the
potential for substantial divergence of interests between, say, a
federal government quite prepared to encourage water exports
(perhaps as part of a broader trade package) and equally reluctant
governments of water-rich provinces, and also between provincial
governments in the water-rich and water-poor regions of the country.
Constitutional conflict would not be far behind (although here the
battle lines sketched above might have to be re-drawn significantly
in view of the fact that section 92A, with its retrospective focus on
the disputes of the 1970s, has no application to water as such).
But, however the resource disputes of the future arise and
for whatever reason, one thing that remains clear is that our federal
system will have to provide the processes by which those disputes
can be managed and ultimately resolved. As John Whyte has
suggested,20 competing federal and provincial interests in relation to
resources will continue to demand "creative reconciliation" in the
future as much as they did in the 1970s, then it is not at all
unreasonable to expect the federal system which generates those
conflicts in the first place to also furnish the techniques for resolving
them.
Like many, John Whyte places great weight on the tools of
cooperative federalism in this regard. Indeed, the recent past has
witnessed a distinct revival of cooperative federalism as a means of
2 0See supra, note 14.
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resolving potentially contentious federal-provincial resource issues.21
For example, even with total judicial victory in its pocket, the federal
government was prepared to offer Newfoundland the 1985 "Atlantic
Accord" as a means of resolving the continuing antagonism that
threatened to hamper development of the Newfoundland offshore
area. Whatever one may think of the substance of the
federal-Newfoundland deal, or of its earlier counterpart with Nova
Scotia (achieved without resort to the courts, it should be noted), or
even of other members of the species such as the "Western Accord"
that was also concluded in 1985 with the Western producing
provinces, still the process of intergovernmental negotiation and
compromise has managed to produce a framework within which
development of a resource can proceed on a basis that is at least
minimally satisfactory to both of the governments involved. In fact,
John Whyte has concluded that the ongoing dispute-resolution
regime adopted in the "Atlantic Accord" (especially the system of
"shifting trumping regulatory power" by which the final say on an
issue falls to either Ottawa or Newfoundland, on a basis specified in
the Accord, depending upon the nature and gravity of the issue
involved) represents a "modern and responsive innovation" in
Canadian constitutional law, one that is worthy of exploration and
perhaps even emulation in other resource-related contexts if Canada
is "to make its federal structure a source of innovation and strength
rather than a source of conflict and confusion."22
But sometimes the litigious alternative is unavoidable. The
role of the Supreme Court in resolving the resource issues presented
to it in the past decade has not always been a happy one, certainly
not for the litigant governments and perhaps not for the Court itself.
Dissatisfaction with some of the Court's decisions in this area has led
to calls for reform of the Court (for instance, through changes in the
process for appointing its members) and even for its entire removal
from the adjudicatory field in relation to intergovernmental disputes
that carry as much political and emotional baggage as do those over
21Although it would be wrong to believe that cooperative federalism vanished entirely
during the 1970s and early 1980s, even during the most heated periods of conflict: see Moull,
supra, note 18.
22See Whyte, supra, note 11 at 334-36.
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resources. Perhaps it is possible to design a new institution that will
do the job in a way that the governments concerned find more to
their liking, although one wonders just how different such an
institution would really be when faced with the same kinds of
invidious choices as the Court has had to make in the past few
years. In the meantime, of course, the Court will have to continue
as the referee in any future intergovernmental resource disputes that
come before it.
But even those who may generally disapprove of the Court's
past performance in this area should not be completely dismayed by
the prospect of its continuing intervention. If further federal-
provincial conflict over resource policy-making powers seems almost
inevitable, it may simply be asking too much of our federal system
to always give us an entirely cooperative resolution to the conflict
through intergovernmental negotiation and accommodation.
Sometimes deeply-held convictions on policy issues will be too
divergent for ready compromise, and political considerations and
personality clashes may likewise hinder amicable settlement.
Someone must then break the impasse, as the Supreme Court did in
relation to the Newfoundland offshore dispute. Given the seemingly
intractable positions of the parties and the heated atmosphere of
their attempts at negotiation, would the federal and Newfoundland
governments ever have reached anything like the "Atlantic Accord"
had the Supreme Court not "resolved" the offshore ownership issue?
Resort to the Court as the occasional "tie-breaker" of Canadian
federalism may thus be a necessary adjunct to the process of dispute
resolution through federal-provincial cooperation. Perhaps it is as
Peter Russell has suggested:
In federal disputes as in family affairs negotiations in which the two parties work out
mutually acceptable solutions is the preferable way of settling conflicts. But the
negotiation process may be enhanced rather than impeded when it takes place in the
shadow of a creditable and balanced adjudicator. The availability of 2uch an
adjudicator may in itself moderate extravagant claims of the protagonists.
Nor is cooperative federalism necessarily a panacea, as
Michael Crommelin has observed in the context of Australian
23P.H. Russell, "The Supreme Court and Federal-Provincial Relations: The Political Use
of Legal Resources" (1985) 11 Can. Pub. Pol. 161 at 169.
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attempts at intergovernmental cooperation in the management of
natural resources.24 In fact, Crommelin's analysis of the long-term
effects of cooperative federalism on the structure and dynamic of the
federal state could lead one to believe that the concept may, in
practice, amount to a Trojan horse for provincial governments. As
the basis for his argument, Crommelin draws upon the following
passage from a 1977 book by his compatriot, Professor Geoffrey
Sawer:
It has become a commonplace of both popular and learned talk that today, if you
must have federalism, then it ought to be and to a considerable extent is bound to
be "cooperative". I have myself in earlier writings distinguished three kinds or stages
of federalism - coordinate, cooperative and organic. However, I am now inclined
to think that while these stages can be traced along a curve or continuum, the
important qualitative change is between cooperative and organic; the first two stages
are less distinct from each other. Indeed, one can give no practical significance to
the expression "cooperative" unless the system in question also has to a considerable
degree the quality of being "coordinate". This is because it is an assumption of
"cooperation" that each of the parties to the arrangement have a reasonable degree
of autonomy, can bargain about the terms of cooperation, and, at least if driven too
hard, decline to cooperate. Coordinate federalism, which has never existed anywhere
in pure form, requires both a capacity for autonomous activity, within the bounds of
specified powers, in all the units of the federal system - the states or provinces and
the centre - and an absence of combined action between them in any of its numerous
possible forms; cooperation may then follow, and as a matter of history in all
contemporary federal nations has become pervasive. At this stage, there is no
theoretical reason why the central authority should always play a dominant role in
the cooperation, and in fact the situation varies greatly from federalism to federalism
and within federalisms, from topic to topic, and from time to time in accordance
with the politics of the time. Organic federalism, however, does demand that the
centre should play the dominant role; it must determine all major substantive policies
and in particular spending choices, and supervise the performance of the regions in
giving effect to such policies and choices. The regions become to a considerable
extent "mere administrators", though this need be no minor role; in21any fields an
administrator has to exercise wide discretions and so mould policy.
Crommelin then asks whether, in Sawer's terms, "a period of
cooperative federalism necessarily results in a shift away from the
coordinate towards the organic." His reasoning is that the measure
of autonomy which Sawer sees as a prerequisite of cooperative
federalism may in fact be diminished by consistent reliance upon
cooperative action. If so, he concludes, "organic federalism may then
426
24M. Crommelin, "Federal-State Cooperation on Natural Resources: The Australian
Experience" in J.O. Saunders, ed., supra, note 11 at 295, 320-21.
2 5 G. Sawer, Federation under Strain (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1977) at 6.
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be a natural outcome of a lengthy period of cooperative
federalism."26
Crommelin goes on to suggest that the Australian experience
in relation to natural resources evidences a trend towards organic
federalism given the expansion of the legislative powers of the
Commonwealth government and its overwhelming financial
supremacy. The Canadian experience is somewhat different, so far
at least, in that the only clear expansion in legislative powers in
respect of natural resources has been at the provincial level, in the
form of section 92A, and the federal government has not yet
managed to wrest from the producing provinces full financial
supremacy over resources in terms either of revenue-raising capacity
or of spending choices (the National Energy Program
notwithstanding). But the future is foreboding, especially if the
"general" trade and commerce power continues its resurgence and
comes to be applied in the resource area, and if the federal
government shows itself to be as willing to use its vast spending
power in respect of provincial resources to the same degree as it has
done in recent times in relation to other areas of provincial
jurisdiction, notably health care and post-secondary education.
Perhaps, then, our recent re-commitment to cooperative federalism
in the resource field signals a start to our own movement towards
the organic stage of federalism that Crommelin sees on the horizon
in Australia.
But even if Crommelin's analysis is correct, and even if we
are moving along the same trend-line as the Australians, the outlook
is not entirely bleak for the governments of the producing provinces.
Sawer's own depiction of his three stages of federalism does not lead
him to believe that a unitary state is necessarily the eventual
outcome of the process. As he says, immediately following the
passage quoted by Crommelin, the "organic" stage of federalism is
still nonetheless "federalism" because there is inherent in it "the
continued existence of some guarantee that the regions in their
reduced role will continue to exist and be able to fight any attempt
by the centre to abolish them altogether or to reduce their functions
26Supra, note 24 at 321.
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beyond some minimum level. 27 In the Australian context, Sawer
sees judicial review as the most reliable method of guaranteeing the
necessary degree of "unit autonomy" - a method which, if and when
applied in the Canadian context, may come as something of a
surprise to those provincial governments that have in the past been
most critical of the interventions of the Supreme Court of Canada
in resource-related issues.
Canada may or may not be moving towards organic
federalism in relation to natural resources; it is simply too early to
tell whether our recent return to cooperative federalism in the area
will lead us inevitably in that direction. But if that is where we end
up, we may well lose something important in the process. In
concluding his comments, Crommelin asks: "What point can there be
in a federal system of government if intergovernmental cooperation
smothers its federal features?"28 Canada has often been described,
with more or less accuracy, as one of the most decentralized
federations in the world, and we are certainly that in comparison to
our neighbour to the south (which may, in fact, represent in some
respects the classic form of organic federalism as defined by Sawer).
But are there not some good reasons for our brand of federalism,
subconscious though they may be?
As we have practiced it, federalism has allowed us a large
measure of regional diversity that would have been impossible had
the bonds of the federation been drawn more tightly towards the
centre. That diversity has in turn allowed for the expression of
views and the assertion of interests by the regional communities,
which together make up the larger national community, in a way that
likewise would have been impossible had the regions been entirely
submerged in the whole. The centrifugal forces of regionalism
operating within our federal structure thus have served as a useful
counter-weight to over-centralization by giving our regions, through
their provincial governments, a voice in policy-making that could
have been strangled in a tighter federation. And perhaps, just
perhaps, the prospects for our national survival have been enhanced
in the bargain. For what would the chances have been for the
27Supra, note 25.
28Supra, note 24 at 321.
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continued existence of Canada as a national community, separate and
apart from the United States, if our component regions had not had
an outlet for their aspirations within their own federation and had
decided instead to seek expression in another?
So perhaps no dismay should be caused by the virtual
certainty of future intergovernmental conflict over natural resources,
or even by the likelihood that the techniques of cooperative
federalism will not always resolve the conflict. Too much conflict,
and conflict that remains unresolved for too long, can be dangerous
to be sure. But perhaps a little turbulence every once in a while is
not only inevitable, but good for us too. Perhaps it helps to
demonstrate, in case we forget, just what our federal system is all
about.

